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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
LOWELL V. PARRISH, EMILY L. 
PARRISH, his wife, VADAL PET-
ERSON and MELVA PETERSON, 
his wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
HARLOW G. RICHARDS and MRS. 
HARLOW G. RICHARDS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8690 
Brief of Respondents 
STATEMENT 
In Utah, as elsewhere : 
"The writ of injunction is issued by the courts 
as a matter of grace and not because the applicant 
has a right to it. (Citations.) The application for 
injunctive relief is in the form of a prayer, ad-
dressed to the conscience of the chancellor, who 
may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, either 
grant the prayer or deny it, as the facts and circum-
stances of the case may seem to require." (Italics 
added.) Melrose vs. Low, 80 Utah 356, 15 P. 2d 
319, 320. 
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2 
"The power to issue injunctions should be exer-
cised with great caution and only where the reason 
and necessity therefor are clearly established." 
(Italics added.) 43 C. J. S. Injunctions §15. 
Equitable principles govern suits to enforce restrictive 
covenants. 14 Am. Jur., Covenants §338. 
"Whether injunctive relief will be granted to re-
strain the violation of building restrictions is a mat-
ter within the sound legal discretion of the chancel-
lor, to be determined in the light of all the facts and 
circumstances. * * *" ld. 
The text continues : 
"The complainants right to insist on the coven-
ant and to invoke the injunctive power of the court 
must be clear and satisfactory." 
C. J. S. says: 
"However, not every violation of a building re-
striction will entitle plaintiff to injunctive relief. 
The granting or refusal of relief is a matter of dis-
cretion with the court and not a matter of absolute 
right, and is to be governed by equitable considera-
tions." 43 C. J. S. Injunctions §87. (Italics added.) 
Applying these principles, Judge Ellett concluded: 
"7. The court concludes that plaintiffs have 
failed as a matter of law to establish that defen-
dants' tennis court and fence is a structure within 
the prohibition of said Restrictive Covenant or that 
plaintiffs have any clear right to any injunction 
against the same. On the other hand, the court con-
cludes the same is not such a prohibited structure 
and that such right is not clear and that plaintiffs 
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3 
are not so entitled. Furthermore, the court concludes 
that in the exercise of sound discretion, such injunc-
tion should and would be denied herein" (R. 203). 
Restrictive Covenants must be construed against limi-
tations and in favor of free use of property. 
"Covenants and agreements restricting the free 
use of property are strictly construed against limi-
tations upon such use. Such restrictions will not be 
aided or extended by implication or enlarged by 
construction. Doubt will be resolved in favor of the 
unrestricted use of property." 14 Am. J ur., Coven-
ants §212. 
"* * * all doubts should generally be re-
solved in favor of the free use of the property and 
against restrictions." Thompson on Real Property, 
§3569. 
Accordingly, Judge Ellett also concluded: 
"5. That defendants' tennis court and fence is 
not a structure as forbidden and prohibited in and 
by the Restrictive Covenant of Northcrest Subdivi-
sion set out in the complaint and the Findings of 
Fact herein. In construing the Covenant, the court 
concludes that as a matter of law, the restriction 
therein must be, and the same is hereby construed 
against limitations on the free use of defendants' 
property and all doubts and ambiguities are hereby 
resolved in favor of such free use" (R. 202). 
Moreover, the plaintiffs themselves are in violation of 
both (1) the Restrictive Covenant, and (2) the fence-
height Ordinance : 
- Plaintiffs Parrish mantain a high, board fence 
or "structure" at the North side of their prop-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
erty over the permitted 6-foot height ( 10 feet 
by their admission, R. 20) and some 35 feet long 
(Finding 10, R. 200) anchored to their house by 
high beams. This fence or structure is 1 inch 
inside their side line (R. 20) which violates also 
the City Sideyard Ordinance against building 
closer than 8 feet from a side line1 in this Resi-
dential "A" District. (The court took judicial 
notice of the City Ordinances. R. 85. City Ordin-
ances, §51-18-4, §51-12-3.) See Photo Exhibits 
16, 17, 18. (Sideyard Ordinance, R. 144.) 
- Plaintiffs Peterson2 maintain a high 10 foot wall 
and fence along the West end of their property 
which violates the permitted 6 foot height of 
fences. (Finding 11, R. 200.) See photos, Ex-
hibits 12 and 13. 
Furthermore, other high walls and fences over 6 feet 
high abound in the area (Finding 12, R. 201). And, swim-
ming pools with flood lights, patios and dressing rooms, 
etc., are maintained by at least two owners in the Subdi-
vision. (R. 69, 75, 199. Photo Exhibit 24. View of trial 
judge, 81.) 3 
As to plaintiffs' own violations, the court concluded: 
"2. Plaintiffs Parrish by erecting and main-
taining said high board fence and plaintiffs Peter-
son by erecting and maintaining said high wall and 
fence have themselves violated said Zoning Ordin-
1This court upheld the 8 foot side-line Ordinance recently (1955) in 
Hargraves vs. Young, 3 Utah 2d 175, 280 P. 2d 974. 
2Plaintiff Vadal Peterson testified he has no objection to athletic 
games. "I even coach tennis" at the University. He has coached there 
32 years (R. 110-11) and plaintiffs admit the court is not a nuisance 
per se (R. 185). 
31n fact, plaintiff, Mrs. Parrisht and her daughter sometimes swim and 
sun at one of the pools (R. 180 J. 
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ance and, being in violation thereof, are thereby es-
topped to and may not maintain any action against 
defendants in regard to the alleged violation of said 
Ordinance respecting the height of defendants' fence 
or fences" (R. 201). 
And, for their failure to object to other fences and 
walls maintained by their neighbors in violation, the court 
concluded: 
"3. The court concludes also that for failure 
to take any action to prevent or remove the high 
walls and fences in the surrounding area above 
mentioned, plaintiffs are estopped to and may not 
maintain any action against defendants in regard 
to the alleged violation of said Ordinance in respect 
to the height of defendants' fence or fences" (R. 
202). 
To complicate matters, the West end of defendants' 
tennis court (and property)-the West 15.2 feet-is not 
in N orthcrest Subdivision at all, but lies beyond that Plat 
in another Section altogether (R. 10) and, of course, is 
not subject to the Restrictive Covenant (Finding 3. R. 
196). What should a trial court do in that circumstance? 
Judge Ellett decided thus: 
"8. The West 15.2 feet of defendants' tennis 
court and fence being wholly outside of N orthcrest 
Subdivision is, therefore, not subject to said Restric-
tive Covenant and the court could not order any in-
junction in regard to same. To order the remainder 
of said court and fence removed would still leave 
the same standing on said 15.2 feet portion and 
would be of no benefit to plaintiffs and would result 
only in punishment to defendants and leave the 15.2 
feet of fence standing as an eyesore, and the court 
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concludes as a matter of equity and sound discre-
tion that injunction should and would be denied 
herein against the portion of said court and fence 
lying within said Northcrest Subdivision" (R. 203). 
Judgment was against the plaintiffs, no cause of action 
(except for prohibiting overhead floodlights on defendants' 
tennis court (R. 204), which their answer had already 
denied they would ever erect) 4 and plaintiffs appealed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TENNIS COURT IS NOT A STRUCTURE 
FORBIDDEN BY THE COVENANT. 
POINT II. 
THE FENCE SURROUNDING THE TENNIS 
COURT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CITY 
FENCE HEIGHT ORDINANCE. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFFS BEING IN VIOLATION OF THE 
FENCE-HEIGHT ORDINANCE MAY NOT SUE 
FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. THE COURT 
PROPERLY HELD THEY WERE ESTOPPED. 
POINT IV. 
AS THE TRIAL COURT RULED, IF THE TEN-
NIS COURT IS A STRUCTURE, THE PARRISH 
4Defendants' answer said: "Deny they intend to or will erect or place 
on any retaining wall, or at all, any overhead lights" (R. 11). 
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7 
HIGH BOARD FENCE IS A STRUCTURE 
ALSO. 
POINT V. 
THE WEST PORTION OF RESPONDENTS' 
LOT LIES OUTSIDE OF NORTHCREST SUB-
DIVISION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE 
COVENANT. 
POINT VI. 
ESTOPPEL OF APPELLANTS BY OTHER 
HIGH WALLS AND SWIMMING POOLS. 
POINT VII. 
CUTTING AND FILLING IS INEVITABLE IN 
THE STEEP HILLSIDE AREA INVOLVED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TENNIS COURT IS NOT A STRUCTURE 
FORBIDDEN BY THE COVENANT. 
The N orthcrest Restrictive Covenant mentions, "struc-
ture". Plaintiffs' Memorandum below admits (R. 40) the 
word "does not have one meaning for all times and all 
places". We agree. Its meaning cannot be found in ordin-
ary lexicography. The dictionary cannot give the answer. 
Webster does not deal with N orthcrest's private meaning. 
So the meaning must be sought in the setting of the 
language employed by the Covenant itself. The Covenant, 
after declaring the residential character of the lots, their 
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use for single family residence purposes, and forbidding 
flats and apartment houses says: 
"* * * and no structure shall be erected or 
placed on any of said lots other than a one, two or 
three car garage, and one single family dwelling, 
not to exceed one story in height * * *" (R. 
196). 
We think construing a covenant is like construing a 
statute. In construing statutes, wor~s associated together 
"take color" from each other. The rule of ejusdem generis 
applies. And ejusdem generis applies also in construing 
covenants. 14 Am. Jur., Covenants §213. 
"Limitation of General Words by Specific 
Terms. - General and specific words in a statute 
which are associated together, and which are cap-
able of an analogous meaning, take color from each 
other, so that the general words are restricted to a 
sense analogous to the less general. Under this rule, 
general terms in a statute may be regarded as lim-
ited by subsequent more specific terms. Similarly, 
in accordance with what is commonly known as the 
rule of ejusdem generis, where, in a statute, general 
words follow a designation of particular subjects 
or classes of persons, the meaning of the general 
words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and con-
strued as, restricted by the pa1·ticular designation 
and as including only things or persons of the same 
kind, class, character, or nature of those specifically 
enumerated. The general words are deemed to have 
been used, not to the wide extent which they might 
bear if standing alone, but as related to words of 
more definite and particular meaning with which 
they are associated. In accordance with the rule of 
ejusdem generis, such terms as 'other', 'other thing', 
'other persons', 'othe·rs', 'otherwise', or 'any other', 
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when preceded by a specific enumeration, are com-
monly given a restricted meaning, and limited to 
articles of the same nature as those previously de-
scribed. The rule of ejusdem generis has been de·-
clared to be a specific application of the broader 
maxim of 'nosciture a sociis', which is discussed in 
other sections of this subdivision." 50 Am. Jur., 
Statutes §249. 
Northcrest's Covenal).t contains two things: (1) a 
general word, and ( 2) specific words. The general "struc-
ture"; the specific "one, two or three-car garage, and one 
single family dwelling, not to exceed one story in height". 
Under the rule, "structure" takes color from "garage and 
single family dwelling". They (the words) are associated 
together. And, by ejusdem generis, the general word "struc-
ture" is restricted and relates to things of the same kind, 
class or nature as the specific words "garage and single 
family dwelling". 
Hence, N orthcrest who imposed the Covenant on all 
grantees, must be presumed to have intended that the kind 
of "structure" forbidden was something more than a sim-
ple enclosure for playing tennis, but rather something like 
a garage or one story house, for example, a shed, a store, 
a kennel, a horse barn, a mortuary, a private mausoleum, an 
extra house, an extra garage, a private museum building, 
a private theater building, a heating plant building, a laun-
dry building, etc., etc. 
If we turn to the residential character referred to in 
the Covenant, this view, we think is strengthened for it is 
quite common for owners to have tennis courts at their 
residences, even swimming pools, as two of them in North-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
crest Subdivision across the street do.5 The only tennis 
court case we have been able to find (and appellants have 
found no others) is Kern vs. Murphy, (Ohio 1936) 40 Ohio 
Supp. 365. 23 A. L. R. 2d 949. That covenant forbade 
"buildings except necessary out buildings". The tennis 
court involved was an "enclosure consisting of steel poles 
about nine feet high carrying chicken wire netting, it being 
in the nature of a high, open wire fence surrounding the 
tennis court". It was held not to be a "building" as con-
templated by the covenant. Nor is the tennis court in our 
case, we submit, a "structure" within the N orthcrest Coven-
ant involved. 
Judge Ellett properly concluded: 
"5. That defendants' tennis court and fence 
is not a structure as forbidden and prohibited in and 
by the Restrictive Covenant of Northcrest Subdivi-
sion set out in the complaint and the Findings of Fact 
herein. In construing the Covenant, the court con-
cludes that, as a matter of law, the restriction therein 
must be, and the same is hereby, construed against 
limitations on the free use of defendants' property 
and all doubts and ambiguities are hereby resolved 
in favor of such free use" (R. 202). 
Also: 
"7. The court concludes that plaintiffs have 
failed as a matter of law to establish that defen-
dants' tennis court and fence is a structure within 
the prohibition of said Restrictive Covenant or that 
plaintiffs have any clear right to any injunction 
against the same. On the other hand, the court con-
cludes the same is not such a prohibited structure 
5Pretrial ( R. 69, 7 4-75). Photo Exhibit 24. 
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11 
and that such right is not clear and that plaintiffs 
are not so entitled. Furthermore, the court concludes 
that in the exercise of sound discretion, such injunc-
tion should and would be denied herein" (R. 203). 
POINT II. 
THE FENCE SURROUNDING THE TENNIS 
COURT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CITY 
FENCE HEIGHT ORDINANCE. 
The trial court heard the evidence. He even took a 
"view" of the three properties-Parrish, Richards and 
Peterson-and the surrounding area (R. 81, 137). A mass 
of testimony was involved about how the properties (each 
fronting Eastward on I Street) sloped· steeply from North 
to South along their width 15% in grade (R. 88, 158). So, 
every owner along the hill had to cut and fill to average 
or "equalize" his North and South property lines. (R. 139) ; 
thus, each property owner "terraced" his yard in two levels, 
as plaintiff Peterson did ( R. 122) . 6 Parrish did likewise 
(R. 94, 96). That is the usual problem on steeply sloping 
properties (R. 139). Dr. Richards built a retaining wall 
along the South of his property to hold the terracing and 
keep the earth from sloughing down hill, while Parrish 
and Peterson "battered their earth back". In fact, Parrish 
raised his lower (South) terrace 3 feet and Peterson did 
a comparable thing (R. 142). "We built a wall. They 
battered the earth. That is the only difference" (R. 142). 
Judge Ellett found that the parties each "terraced" their 
6In fact, the Peterson retaining wall was found to be over on Respon-
dent Richards' property at the East end (front) but Dr. Richards 
told Peterson "it was all right to leave it the way it was" (R. 124). 
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respective properties into two levels or terraces, that cut-
ting and filling was necessary to level off each terrace 
and make the same useful and suitable and that retaining 
walls were built "in order to hold the earth in place and 
prevent its washing and sloughing away" (R. 198). 
A rough result of the required terracing of these prop-
erties might be indicated by the accompanying sketch. 
( LooJd.na Veatward) 
Reta1n1ng 
Vall 
Battered 
Barth 
Note: Excellent views of the steep slope of the land and the "terrac-
ing" required in this hillside area are shown by the photographs 
in the record: 
( 1) Parrish' property (upper left) Exhibits D-3 and 11; 
(upper right) Exhibits 16, 17 and 19 (earth battered 
back). (R. 67, 117-18, 146, 147.) 
(2) Peterson's rear (West) fence. Exhibits 12, 13. (R. 118-
20.) 
(3) E. B. Kuhe property, 629 Aloha Road. Exhibit 22. (R. 
168.) 
( 4) Von Holbrook property, 652 Aloha Road. Exhibit 23. (R. 
170.) 
(5) Clifford 0. Gledhill property, 625 Northcrest Drive. Ex-
hibit 24. (R. 71, 172.) Note the terracing and "earth 
battered back" of this property around the swimming 
pool. 
The burden was on plaintiffs to prove the Richards' 
tennis court fence actually violated the Ordinance. That it 
was over 6 feet high. Six feet from where? The sidewalk 
level cannot govern. That walk is at least 2 and even as 
much as 4 feet belo~o the original land level in places. Plain.;. 
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tiff Parrish, an architect, said so (R. 92, 93). And what 
constitutes the "fence", the metal posts and wire or the 
latter and the base or wall on which they rest? Remember, 
in injunction cases, plaintiffs (1) have the burden of proof 
as in other actions, and (2) their right must be clear -
clearly established. 7 
Appellants claim some evidence about the Richards 
retaining wall on which the fence rests, being at one point 
some 36 inches higher than the "natural grade" (whatever 
that is). Appellants' Brief, 10. But, plaintiff P·eterson 
explained the "low point" on the terrain (which must have 
created the corresponding high point on the retaining wall 
between his property and Richards') resulted from floods 
which had coursed across the Richards lot before the homes 
were built (R. 101-02) following a "natural, low ravine 
that had been there" (R. 115). 
The Ordinance talks about "average grade", saying 
fences must not exceed 6 feet above the "average grade of 
adjoining properties". Section 51-4-4. Where is that? 
Appellants have not shov1n that. Nor, clearly so, as they 
must. Average grade is not defined. Do we measure 6 feet 
on the ground as now exposed (or at an assumed level) at 
the corner posts and then shear off everything above a 
straight line extending between the two? Or, do we do that 
between sections or posts or levels, cutting one down, leav-
ing the next up, another down, another up, etc., etc.? The 
clarity of that is ··something to dwell upon. After viewing 
the properties and the surrounding area and hearing all 
7Page 2 herein. 43 C. J. S., Injunctions §15. 14 Am. Jur., Coven-
ants §338. 
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of the confusing evidence, and considering the Ordinance, 
Judge Ellett finally concluded, as he only could, from that 
mass of confusion and uncertainty, that the fence surround-
ing the tennis court "does not violate the Zoning Ordinance" 
(R. 201) . That conclusion was inescapable upon this 
record. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFFS BEING IN VIOLATION OF THE 
FENCE-HEIGHT ORDINANCE MAY NOT SUE 
FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. THE COURT 
PROPERLY HELD THEY WERE ESTOPPED. 
"Where the one requesting the injunction has 
himself violated the restriction upon his own prop-
erty, he will be held estopped by his own violation, 
and the remedy will be refused." 57 A. L. R. 340. 
That thread runs all through the decisions. One vio-
lator may not sue another violator. That is only common 
sense. So, if the Richards fence actually reaches above the 
6 foot Zoning Ordinance in spots (and we deny it does), 
plaintiffs are barred. Why? Because Parrish's high board 
fence (on the North-Photo Exhibits 16, 17 and 18) and 
Peterson's high wall and fence (along the West-Photo 
Exhibits 12 and 13) both violate the fence-height Ordinance. 
(And, Parrish's also violates the 8 foot side-line Ordinance, 
besides. See Page 4 herein.) 
Thus, the A. L. R. quote above has reference to co-vio-
lators of restrictive covenants; but there can be no differ-
ence in reason or in law between co-violators of a covenant 
and co-violators of a city o1·dinance. They simply may not 
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sue each other for the same violation. On this subject 
Tiffany, Law of Real Property, §873 says: 
"One cannot obtain relief in equity against the 
violation of a restrictive agreement * * * if he 
himself is guilty of a substantial breach of the same 
restriction." 
And look at the following court decisions: 
Kneip vs. Schroeder (Ill.) 99 N. E. 617. (1912) : 
Building line case. Injunction denied. The head 
note reads: "Owners of lots who have encroached 
upon a building line along a street are not entitled 
to complain of an encroachment to be constructed 
by another owner." 
Balcom vs. Normile (Mass.) 150 N. E. 885. 
(1926) : Injunction denied against a six-car garage 
where plaintiff maintains a two-car garage. "the 
plaintiff is not in a position to claim * * * that 
his neighbor should be enjoined from using her 
premises for a garage * * * plaintiff is violat-
ing such restriction as much as his neighbor and is 
not * * * in a position where he can equitably 
claim that she should be enjoined * * * it is 
settled that because of her own acts she cannot in-
voke the aid of a court of equity to prevent the 
defendant from erecting and maintaining the ga-
rages." 
Smith vs. Spencer, (N. J. 1913) 87 A. 158. Suit 
to enjoin 2 foot 2 inch building projection beyond 
the set-back line. Injunction was denied "* * * 
for the reason that they (plaintiffs) are guilty of 
the same kind of violation of the covenant * * * 
It is well settled that one who violates a mutual 
covenant cannot complain to a court of equity of a 
similar violation by his neighbor." 
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Moore vs. Adams (Ark. 1940) 140 S. W. 2d 49. 
Trailer Camp Case. Injunction denied because: "the 
parties here complaining of its violation have them-
selves violated the general plan in the respects herein 
stated, and they are in no position to complain." 
Wischmeyer vs. Finch (Ind.) 107 N. E. 2d 661. 
Trailer Camp Case. Injunction denied because: "in-
junctive relief will be denied where complainant has 
substantially violated the restrictions * * *" 
The court also said, "the granting or refusing of 
relief in the violation of a building restriction is a 
matter within the discretion of the trial court and 
is to be governed by equitable principles." (Italics 
added.) 
McGovern vs. Brown (Ill. 1925) 147 N. E. 664. 
Suit to enjoin violation of 30 foot set-back building 
line by six porches of an apartment house extending 
10 to 12 feet over the line. Several of the plaintiffs 
had viola ted the building line themselves. Injunction 
denied. "* * * three of the plaintiffs have 
themselves violated it in constructing their buildings. 
Under the previous decisions of this court, complain-
ants cannot and will not be allowed to enforce the 
restrictions against defendants." 
Curtis vs. Rubin (Ill. 1910) 91 N. E. 84. Build-
ing line encroachment case. Injunction denied. "In 
this case the complainants, who had themselves dis-
regarded the building line, were asking a court of 
equity to enforce the restriction * * * we do 
not think that the complainants who had disregarded 
the restriction * * * could be heard to object 
that defendants were violating the condition to a 
greater extent than they were." 
Appellants' Brief (P. 14) asserts the Richards fence 
depreciates Appellants' property but that the Parrish-Peter-
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son high fences (each admittedly well over 6 feet) actually 
"enhance" values of the surrounding properties. The asser-
tion is amazing and how it could result is not explained. 
Appellants wonder also if the Parrish fence should estop the 
Petersons. But, Parrish and Peterson, having made com-
mon cause together in the complaint against Respondents, 
we submit that each must suffer the consequences of his 
co-plaintiff's violations. Having joined as plaintiffs, their 
cause of action "if not good as. to one plaintiff, is bad as 
to all of them". 71 C. J. S., Pleading §72. 8 
Peterson claims his violative fence is only "temporary". 
Appellants' Brief (P. 13). He so claimed below (R. 119). 
But, the Ordinance allows no exception for temporary fenc-
ing. It is addressed to all fences. Moreover, Judge Ellett 
"viewed" this fence himself. From the evidence and the 
view, he rejected the contention. The photographs in evi-
dence support his rejection and show the permanent char-
acter of the Peterson fence. (Exhibits 12 and 13.) It has 
been standing since the summer of 1954 (R. 128). 
POINT IV. 
AS THE TRIAL COURT RULED, IF THE TEN-
NIS COURT IS A STRUCTURE, THE PARRISH 
HIGH BOARD FENCE IS A STRUCTURE 
ALSO. 
This proposition is clear enough to the court, we think. 
The trial court took a "view" October 4, 1956 (R. 81, 137) 
8That proposition is akin to the rule that a joint exception to a jury 
instruction must be good as to all who join or it will be bad as to 
each. 88 C. J. S., Trial §420; and that joint assignments of error, if 
not good as to one, are bad as to all. 4 C. J. S., Appeal & Error 
§1248. McGuire vs. State Bank, 49 Utah 381. 164 P. 494. 
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and saw this high board fence. It is over 10 feet high. And it 
is braced with two large, heavy beams across the top an-
chored to the Parrish roof. It is fully shown in the photo-
graphs in evidence. (Exhibits 16, 17 and 18.) Clearly, if 
the tennis court is a structure, this high board fence is also 
a structure. And, in that event, plaintiffs having violated 
the Covenant themselves by maintaining their own struc-
ture, are barred from enforcing the Covenant. One violator 
may not sue another violator to enjoin a similar violation 
of a covenant. (Please turn to Page 14 herein.) 
The trial judge ruled : 
"6. That if defendants' tennis court and fence 
be construed to be a structure within the prohibition 
of said Restrictive Covenant, plaintiffs Parrish' high 
board fence and beams anchored to the Parrish 
house must likewise be construed as a structure; and 
plaintiffs, by so maintaining said high board fence, 
are thus estopped to and may not maintain any 
action against defendants in regard to the alleged 
violation of the Covenant respecting a structure" 
(R. 202). 
POINT V. 
THE WEST PORTION OF RESPONDENTS' 
LOT LIES OUTSIDE OF NORTHCREST SUB-
DIVISION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE 
COVENANT. 
As the answer shows (R. 10) and as Appellants ad-
mitted in response to Respondents' interrogatories (No. 3, 
R. 21), the West 15.2 feet of the Richards property lies 
wholly outside of N orthcrest. The trial court so found, as 
he was bound to do (R. 196). Of course, then, that outside 
portion (and the tennis court thereon) is not subject to 
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the Restrictive Covenant, as Judge Ellett concluded (R. 
203) . To order the balance of the court removed (the part 
within N orthcrest) would be to leave the West 15.2 feet 
of the tennis court in place. That would result in a dangling 
eyesore. That injunction would simply serve as punishment 
and reprisal to Dr. Richards and his wife. Furthermore, it 
would also be harmful and damaging to plaintiffs, particu-
larly Peterson, whose residence would then abut the useless 
remains. The trial court so concluded (R. 203) . 
But, since sound discretion is the touchstone, it must 
be clear, we think, that injunctions do not lie simply to 
vindicate one litigant as againt another, nor to punish or 
oppress. 
"Since an injunction should not be made an 
instrument of oppression and injury, it will not be 
granted when good conscience does not require it, 
where it will operate oppressively or contrary to 
justice, where it is not reasonable and equitable 
under the circumstances. * * *" 43 C. J. S., In-
junctions §12. 
We submit that it would have been most unreasonable 
and inequitable to order Dr. Richards to remove that part 
of the tennis court within the plat when the West 15.2 feet 
beyond would be left. Sound discretion, we think, could 
not possibly arrive at such result. The trial court properly 
so ruled. 
POINT VI. 
ESTOPPEL OF APPELLANTS BY OTHER 
HIGH WALLS AND SWIMMING POOLS. 
It was shown on the trial and the court found (R. 201) 
that the N orthcrest Subdivision area abounds with high 
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fences and walls. Photographs are in evidence showing 
some of these. (Exhibits 22, 23. R. 167, 168, 170.) Dr. 
Richards testified to at least three high walls or fences 
which are well over 6 feet-in fact, far above his reach, as 
shown by the photographs: (1) Kuhe's high retaining 
wall, 629 Aloha Road (Exhibit 22), across the street North 
from the Freed residence and swimming pool which the 
trial court saw, (2) Holbrook's high wall and fence, 652 
Aloha Road (Exhibit 23), next to the Freed residence, and 
(3) Montague's high wall next door South of Petersons' 
property. Failure to take action against these fences and 
walls, the trial court held, estopped Appellants from chal-
lenging Respondents' fences (R. 202). 
Then, there are the swimming pools : ( 1) the Freed 
pool, shower and dressing rooms (where Mrs. Parrish and 
her daughter sometimes swim and sun (R. 180), and, (2) 
the Gledhill's pool and bath houses just East of Petersons 
(Photo Exhibit 24). The evidence (undisputed) was that 
both pools necessitated dismantling of the West section of 
each owner's fence in construction; that trucks, workmen 
and machinery came and went and operated for months 
right under Appellants' noses, so to speak, in constructing 
the two pools and that none of Appellants objected (R. 
173-76) . They thereby accepted, impliedly at least, the 
pools and dressing rooms as not being structures banned 
by the Covenant. The tennis court, we submit, is even less 
such a structure, being far less fixed and permanent than 
the swimming pools. 
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POINT VII. 
CUTTING AND FILLING IS INEVITABLE IN 
THE STEEP HILLSIDE AREA INVOLVED. 
The area involved is a steep hillside one. Steep slopes 
require cutting, filling, retaining walls, etc. That is just 
common sense. It is common knowledge. The California 
court recognizes this. It said in Beck vs. Bell Air Proper-
ties (Cal.) 286 P. 2d 503, 509 : 
"* * * it is a matter of common knowledge 
that retaining walls, hillside terracing, planting and 
similar methods have been extensively and success-
fully used to hold fills in place. This is particularly 
true in the territory surrounding Los Angeles; and 
is evidenced by the extensive building operations 
made possible by hillside fills in the Baldwin Hills, 
the Hollywood Hills and the Santa Monica Moun-
tains. 
"Moreover, the creation, construction and main-
tenance of hillside fills is a matter of common usage. 
Cutting, leveling and filling are the inevitable, con-
stant and ordinary methods pursued in the develop-
ment of hillside areas." 
Plaintiffs conceded that cutting and filling is neces-
sary.9 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen that injunction is by grace, alone, issu-
able only in the sound discretion of the court. What court? 
"The court which is to exercise the discretion 
is the trial court and not the appellate court." 43 
C. J. S., Injunctions § 14. 
9
"* * * plaintiffs concede that property owners whose property 
is located on hilly terrain must, to a certain extent, cut and fill, and 
that the original grade should not necessarily govern. * * *" 
(Plaintiffs' Pretrial Memorandum. R. 30.) 
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And, 
"Generally, in the absence of manifest abuse of 
discretion, an appellate court will not review, modify 
or revise discretionary rulings as to the grant, dis-
solution, continuance or modification of an injunc-
tion or restraining order." 5 C. J. S., Appeal & 
Error § 1591. 
Throughout the trial court's conclusions, it is stated 
that the injunction was denied "in the exercise of a sound 
discretion" (R. 202, 203). That sound discretion was exer-
cised and arrived at after a full hearing of all the facts 
regarding these properties and a "view" thereof by the 
Judge. 
Error is never presumed. On the contrary, all reason-
able presumptions are indulged in favor of the judgment 
below and against error-
"* * * and the burden of affirmatively 
showing error is on the party complaining thereof." 
5 C. J. S., Appeal & Error §1533. 
Appellants have failed to show error in and by the 
trial court. They have failed to show the exercise of its 
discretion was abused. Consequently, the judgment refus-
ing the injunction must stand. 
And: 
"One seeking to enforce a restriction has the 
burden of demonstrating that his version of it should 
be sustained or is sustained by the plain and natural 
interpretation of its language, or that the activity 
objected to is within the terms of the restriction." 
26 C. J. S., Deeds §163. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
Appellants have failed to demonstrate that their ver-
sion of the tennis court (that it is a structure prohibited by 
the Restriction) is sustained by the restrictive language. 
Restrictive covenants are to be construed against limita-
tions and in favor of free use of the property, as the trial 
court decided. 
Respondents submit: 
1. The tennis court is not a structure forbidden by 
the Covenant. The term structure therein must 
be given color by the words "one, two or three 
car garage and one single family dwelling". 
The rule ejusdem generis applies. 
2. The fence surrounding the tennis court does 
not violate the City fence-height Ordinance. 
Appellants failed to prove that it does. 
3. Being in violation themselves of the fence-
height Ordinance, Appellants were estopped, 
as the trial court held, to sue for injunctive 
relief. Their fences violated the Ordinance. One 
violator may not sue another violator. 
4. If the tennis court were ruled to be a structure, 
the Parrish high, board fence is a structure 
also. Again, one violator may not sue another 
violator to enjoin a similar violation of a re-
strictive covenant. 
5. The West portion ( 15.2 feet) of Respondents' 
property lies wholly outside of Northcrest. It 
is not subject to the Restrictive Covenant. The 
trial court's refusal-discretionary refusal-in 
that circumstance to enjoin the tennis court was 
correct. 
6. Appellants were estopped by their failure to 
oppose or object to the numerous high walls and 
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the swimming pools in the surrounding North-
crest area. 
7. Cutting, filling, terracing and retaining walls 
are inevitable in the steep hillside area involved. 
The trial court heard the evidence. It also "viewed" 
the premises and area involved. In the exercise of "sound 
discretion", it refused the injunction and dismissed. Abuse 
of discretion has not been shown. Appellants have not es-
tablished any error. The judgment below was correct and 
must be affirmed, with costs to Respondents. 
September, 1957. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS & ARMSTRONG, 
EDWARD M. GARRETT, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
511 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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